Original title: Guangdong Foshan Rail Transit Line 2 phase I project "2. 7" water seepage collapse major accident investigation report released
Through the review and approval by the State Council of the State Council, the provincial government recently approved the investigation report on the major accident of "2. 7" in the first phase of the 2 line project of rail transit in Foshan, Guangdong province. The provincial government investigation team concluded that it was a liability accident.
At 20:40 on February 7, 2018, the construction of the first phase of the first phase of Foshan Rail Transit Line 2 ("TJ1 section") the right line of the shield of the Green Island Lake Station to the right line of the Green Island Lake Station caused the collapse of the tunnel and the pavement, resulting in the death of 11 people, the missing of 1, and the injury of 8 people. The direct economic loss is about 53 million 238 thousand yuan.
After the accident, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, the Guangdong Provincial Committee and the provincial government attached great importance to it, and the central and provincial leaders successively issued important instructions and instructions. Entrusted by the provincial Party committee and the provincial government principal responsible comrades, Lin Shao Chun's standing deputy governor arrived at the accident scene to command, supervise the accident rescue, the aftermath, the emergency and the accident investigation and treatment. The former State Administration of safety supervision, the Ministry of housing and urban and rural construction sent a working group to the scene to guide in time.
In February 8th, the provincial government approved the establishment of the provincial government deputy secretary general Zhang Aijun, the provincial government of the province, the provincial public security department, the provincial Office of urban and rural construction, the provincial transportation department, the Provincial Safety Supervision Bureau, the provincial law office, the provincial general trade union and the Foshan municipal government responsible for the accident. Conduct a survey. The investigation team has recruited 9 expert groups in the field of geotechnical, structural, hydrogeological, electromechanical and safety engineering to assist in the investigation.
The investigation group adhered to the principle of "four non letting" and "scientific rigorous, according to law, seeking truth from facts, and paying attention to actual effect". Through on-site inspection, consulting information, investigation and forensics, inspection and identification and expert demonstration, the investigation group found out the causes, casualties and direct economic losses of the accident. The nature and responsibility of the accident, put forward the suggestions for the handling of the responsible personnel and responsible units, analyzed the outstanding problems and lessons of the accident, and put forward the measures to prevent the accident.
The investigation group found out the direct cause of the accident: first, there was a deep rich water powder sand layer in the accident section and the medium coarse sand layer near the strong water permeability. The groundwater was under pressure, and the risk of the collapse of the water permeable sand and sushing mud when the shield passed through the area was high; two, the seal tail sealing device was used in the process of sealing performance and the shield tail. The seal is penetrated by external water and soil pressure to produce water permeable sanding channel, and three is to carry on the emergency operation in the tunnel under the serious condition of sushing mud and sand, and the evacuation is not timely. After the damage of the tunnel structure, a large number of mud sand is poured into the tunnel, and the strong mud sand flow and the air waves are impacted to the direction of the hole in the narrow space. The failure of some personnel resulted in serious casualties.
The construction unit Zhong Jiao investment company commissioned the first phase of Foshan Rail Transit Line 2 project in accordance with the general contracting model of EPC engineering, and the TJ1 section was organized by the two China traffic bureau. The two Shipping Bureau set up the project department to complete the construction of the TJ1 section, with one branch, two branch and shield branch, which are set up by the three company of China traffic bureau, the Southern Co of the China exchange two air Bureau and the equipment branch of the China exchange two Shipping Bureau. The No. three company of the two Shipping Bureau of the accident section undertakes the construction project of the 4 station and 3 section of the shield construction project, including the accident interval, to the equipment branch of the China exchange two navigation bureau. The project department and the equipment branch of the China exchange two air Bureau jointly implement the safety production management of the shield division. The survey found that the safety risk management and control of the shield construction of the two China Traffic Bureau equipment branch and the two China traffic bureau of China traffic bureau was insufficient, the emergency disposal was improper, the workers were not withdrawn in time, and the effective technical and management measures were not taken to eliminate the hidden danger of the shield tail sealing performance in time, and the accident was responsible for the accident. The implementation of the responsibility system for safety production of the CAAC II Bureau is not effective, and the equipment branch of the CAAC II Bureau and the three companies of the CAAC II Bureau are neglected in violation of safety production laws and regulations. China Jiaotong Fotou Investment Company has not taken effective measures to supervise and urge construction units to rectify major risks and hidden dangers. The responsibility of safety production supervision of Guangzhou Rail Supervision Company is not in place, and the rectification and implementation of major risks and hidden dangers are not followed up. The Foshan iron and steel investment company failed to report the supervision to the Foshan municipal government as required. Zhengzhou Huayu labor company did not carry out safety production education and training to the labor workers dispatched to the accident zone.
The survey found that the government of Foshan and Chancheng was not in place to implement the responsibility system for safety production, the management of safety production and the failure of the competent departments of the industry to fulfill the safety production responsibility. The Foshan Municipal Transportation Bureau did not enforce the safety supervision of the urban rail transit project, and did not strictly follow the legal conditions. The administration of Foshan municipal land and Planning Bureau (track office) is not strict with the administrative license of urban rail transit project, and the comprehensive coordination and supervision is inadequate, and the safety supervision of the Foshan Chancheng District track office on the urban rail traffic engineering project is not regulated. Strict; Foshan municipal public security fire bureau did not strictly perform the relevant legal duties; the Bureau of human resources and social security of Chancheng District of Foshan was not able to inspect the daily inspection of the employers, and the Bureau of safety production supervision and administration of Foshan was not in place and had insufficient work.
The investigation team made suggestions for 33 responsible persons. Among them, 1 persons were exempt from accountability (who died in the accident); the public security organs have investigated and taken compulsory measures against 2 enterprise personnel, and proposed corresponding disciplinary measures and accountability for 16 central enterprises, 2 local enterprises, and 11 local governments and their related functional departments. 1 persons were treated in a separate case. The investigation group also suggested that China should instruct the State Council to make a profound examination to the State Council and the State Council and the municipal government of the Foshan Municipal Committee and the municipal government to make a thorough examination to the Provincial Committee and the provincial government; and the Foshan municipal government ordered the Foshan Municipal Transportation Bureau, the land and Planning Bureau (the municipal track office) to decide on the administrative license not made strictly according to the conditions of the law. In accordance with the law, the administrative departments of the two air traffic bureau of the China exchange, the three company of the China exchange bureau of two airlines and their main responsible persons shall carry out administrative penalties according to law, and the administrative departments of Foshan traffic administration shall deal with the illegal acts of Hua Yu labor service company and Guangzhou railway supervision company according to law.
The accident exposed 6 lessons: first, the participants did not firmly establish the concept of security development, put the safety in the first place; the two was the weak awareness of the safety risk of the subway shield construction under the complex geological conditions, and the three was the mismanagement of the risk and the misconduct in the field; and the four was the project. The Department does not smooth the safety management system of the shield section, and the unified management flows in the form; five is the lag of the technical standards, regulations and regulations of the urban rail transit shield construction; and the six is the lack of industry pertinence for the safety supervision of the functional departments. In view of the above problems, the investigation group put forward 5 suggestions for accident prevention measures: first, to strengthen the safety risk prevention of shield construction under complex geological conditions and to prevent and contain heavy and serious accidents effectively; two to strengthen the monitoring and control of the key indicators in the process of shield construction, and to improve the emergency rescue ability of major dangers; The three is to strengthen the construction management of rail traffic engineering, improve the risk management and control ability; four is to fully implement the responsibility of the main body of the central Cantonese building enterprise safety production, and consciously accept the safety supervision of the local government departments; five is to fulfill the safety supervision responsibility of the construction of rail transportation engineering, and strictly check all kinds of illegal illegality in the field of strict engineering construction. Behavior.
Editor in responsibility: Yu Pengfei
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